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Abstract: A number of research works have been devoted to the optimization of protection strategies (e.g. 
transmission line switch off) of critical infrastructures (e.g. power grids, telecommunication networks, 
computer networks, etc) to avoid cascading failures. This work aims at improving a previous optimization 
approach proposed by some of the authors [1], based on the modified binary differential evolution (MBDE) 
algorithm. The improvements are three-fold: 1) in the optimization problem formulation, we introduce a 
third objective function to minimize the impacts of the switching off operations onto the existing network 
topology; 2) in the optimization problem formulation, we use the final results of cascades, rather than only a 
short horizon of one step cascading, to evaluate the effects of the switching off strategies; 3) in the 
optimization algorithm, the fast non-dominated sorting mechanisms are incorporated into the MBDE 
algorithm: a new algorithm, namely non-dominated sorting binary differential evolution algorithm (NSBDE) 
is then proposed. The numerical application to the topological structure of the 380 kV Italian power 
transmission network proves the benefits of the improvements.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s deregulated markets, critical infrastructures (CIs) (e.g. electric power grids, telecommunication 
networks, transportation networks, etc) are often run under stressful conditions which render their 
components more sensitive and vulnerable to natural and/or man-made disturbances [2, 3]. In such systems, 
failure of one component may lead to a cascade of failures of other components and this can result in serious 
economical and social damages, as shown, for example, by recent large-scale blackouts of power grids [4, 5].  
To confront this challenge, a number of analytical/simulation models have been built to anticipate the 
impact of cascading failures in complex networks. These models can be classified into three groups: 1) 
probabilistic models (e.g. CASCADE [6] and branching processes [7]); 2) complex network models (e.g. 
dynamic flow model [8], degree distribution model [9-12], and shortest path routing model [13, 14]); 3) 
physical simulation models (e.g. Oak Ridge-PSERC-Alaska (OPA) model [15], and Power System Analyzer 
(PSA) model [16], and Texas A&M (TAM) model [17]). The first group of probabilistic models does not 
rely on the topological characteristics of the network (e.g. degree, centrality, etc). The second group resorts 
to graph theory to represent the topological properties of the components (nodes or links), which are used to 
describe the loads, and those of the whole network, which are used to define the failure redistribution 
mechanisms. The third group sets itself to account for both the network topology and the physical character 
of the actual systems (e.g. in the case of electrical power network, the power injection and flow according to 
circuit laws [18]).  
The second group of models has been proposed for the vulnerability analysis of CIs [1, 3, 19-23] to: (1) 
identify preliminary vulnerabilities of CIs by topology-driven and dynamic analyses; (2) direct and focus 
further detailed analyses on the most critical areas of the CIs. Complex network models can also be practical 
in devising and verifying network protection (NP) techniques aimed at hampering the propagation of 
cascading failures. Such NP techniques are broadly divided in: (1) network interdiction [24-30], which 
enhances the network protection by designing/enhancing components and/or allocating redundancies to 
avoid failures, and (2) line switching [31-36], which hinders the failure propagation by cutting off the 
possible ‘directions’ along which the failures can spread within the network. Within the complex networks 
frame of work, line switching amounts to disconnecting edges (e.g. removing lines in a power system, 
closing a road in a transportation system or a pipe in a fluid distribution network, or disconnecting a router in 
an information system) in order to avoid or alleviate component overloads that may arise from the 
occurrence of failures in the infrastructure, which hence may initiate a cascading failure process. Such a 
strategy may be employed by an infrastructure either as a manual strategy or as an implemented automatic 
control strategy, in order to re-route flows so that heavily congested components are relieved. Line switching 
has been shown capable of dealing with cascading failures by proactive and economical actions that can be 
implemented immediately after the cascading initiation [1, 32]. The success of this technique relies on the 
search for the optimal set of lines to be switched-off, with the objective of minimizing the extent of 
cascading failures [1, 13, 37].  
In a previous work [1], some of the authors have considered a two–objective optimization framework to 
minimize the connectivity losses in the system at both global and local levels. In the present work, a third 
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objective is included to minimize the number of lines being switched off in order to reduce the impact of the 
switch-off operations onto the topology of the existing network and the associated costs. Indeed, after the 
switch-off is performed, the resulting connectivity reduction may often weaken the network leaving it even 
more vulnerable than before to further attacks or failures. 
To solve the optimization problem for line switching, which is large-scale, nonlinear and combinatorial 
in nature, we propose a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA), namely non-dominated sorting 
binary differential evolution (NSBDE) algorithm, whose novelty lies in incorporating the fast non-dominated 
sorting mechanisms [38] into the modified binary differential evolution algorithm (MBDE) [39]. DE is a 
population-based stochastic optimization technique [40] with successful applications in various scientific and 
engineering fields [41-43]. It is often reported that DE has superior performances than other evolutionary 
algorithms (e.g. genetic algorithms, particle swarm optimization) [44]. MBDE is a novel binary version of 
binary differential evolution (DE) [39] specialized on combinatorial problems. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the cascading failure simulation model, 
the measure of cascading failure consequences, and the protection strategy, i.e. transmission line switching; 
Section 3 presents the general formulation of multi-objective optimization problems; Section 4 describes the 
detailed procedures of the proposed NSBDE algorithm; Section 5 presents the experiment results of NSBDE 
including the analyses and comparisons with the previous work [1]; Section 6 presents the discussions on the 
complex network modeling of cascading failures; Section 7 concludes this study and points out future 
research directions. 
 
2. CASCADING FAILURE MODEL AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 
 
2.1 Cascading failure model 
In general, the simulation of cascading failures in large-scale networks is computationally expensive. In 
order to focus on analyzing the failure propagation process and devising the prevention and/or mitigation 
measures, a complex network model has been developed by some of the authors [1]. The graph 
representation is used to abstract the electrical properties of the network, while retaining its structural 
properties. The representation is given in the form of an undirected graph         consisting of a set of 
    nodes (substations or buses) and     links (transmission lines). The elements in the set V are divided into 
two subsets:    generation nodes, i.e. sources of power, and    distribution nodes, i.e. loads or substations. 
The network structure is described by an adjacency matrix       of the size        : if there is a link 
between node i and node j, the entry      , otherwise      . The power is assumed to flow along the 
generator-distributor shortest paths [13, 19, 37, 45, 46].  
The load (or stress) on a network component, e.g. a node or transmission line, is modeled as dependent 
on the number of shortest paths transiting through it, when the power flow is sent from the available 
generation nodes to the distribution nodes. More precisely, the load,    of node i is measured by the node 
betweenness [47, 48], calculated as the fraction of the generator-distributor shortest paths passing through 
that node:  
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where      is the total number of nodes in the graph  ,     is the number of shortest paths between the 
generator-distributor nodes, and        is the number of generator-distributor shortest paths passing through 
the node j. Likewise, the load,     of a link   , is measured by the edge betweenness, calculated as the 
fraction of the generator-distributor shortest paths through that link [49].  
Each component in the network has a definite capacity, i.e. a maximum load it can sustain. The capacity 
of node i (or link   ) is assumed to be proportional to its nominal load    (or    ) at which it is designed to 
operate,            (or             ), where     is the tolerance parameter assumed the same for 
all elements of the entire network. Despite the simplicity of the concept of  , it can be regarded as an 
operating margin allowing safe operations of the components under possible load increments. When    , 
the system is working at its limit capacity; any further load added to a component would result in its failure 
and, possibly, in cascading failures affecting a large portion of the network. 
In the case that a component’s load    (or    ) exceeds its capacity    (or    ), it is considered as failed, 
and thus, removed from the network. This leads to a redistribution of the shortest paths in the network and, 
consequently, to a change in the loads of some working components. If the loads on some components 
exceed their capacities upon the redistribution of the shortest paths, the components fail and, consequently, a 
new redistribution follows. The process continues until there are no further failures or all the components are 
failed [13, 14]. 
 
2.2 Measuring cascading failure consequences 
To measure the effects of cascading failures, the connectivity loss    is used [13, 37]. It quantifies the 
decrease of the ability of distribution substations to receive power from generators: 
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where         and        represent the numbers of generators and substations in the initial state of 
the network respectively, and   
  represents the number of generators able to supply power to distribution 
node i after the cascade of failures takes place.    is an indicator that measures the effects of cascading 
failures at the global system level. On the other hand, it fails to identify the critical locations to which power 
supply has to be guaranteed under any contingency. Therefore, a second, local indicator     is proposed to 
measure the effects of cascading failures on an identified critical region A. It quantifies the decrease of the 
ability of the distribution substations within the area A to receive power supply from any generator in the 
whole network: 
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where    represents the number of distribution nodes within the area A at the initial state of the network, 
and  
  represents the number of generation units able to supply power flow to distribution node i in the area 
A, after the cascade of failures takes place.  
The cascade size S can also be used to quantify the effects of cascading failures. It is defined as the number 
of nodes that fail and are disconnected from the network at the end of the cascade propagation [1]. Due to the 
strong correlation between them (i.e. an increase of S produces an increase of   ) and importance of    to the 
power engineers, we use    to formulate the first two objectives of the optimization problem. 
 
2.3 Cascading failure protection strategy and definitions of the objective functions 
In this work, the NP is modeled as an operator intervention targeting at minimizing the effects of the cascade 
failure propagation at both system and local levels by switching off a set of transmission lines immediately 
after a cascading failure is triggered. Due to the rapid unfolding of a cascading failure, it is assumed that the 
protection intervention takes place only once after the cascade is triggered: no further actions to correct the 
effects of this only protective action are taken [1]. Then, the problem arises of what is the best set of lines 
whose disconnection hinders the cascade propagation at the maximum while maintaining the minimum 
impact on the topology of the existing network. This issue is crucial because the intentional disconnection of 
lines may worsen the effects of the cascade in the same way as failure propagation does.  
As previously explained, the two indicators,    and    , can be used to quantify the effects of cascading 
failures. The global protection optimization seeks interventions that minimize the objective function 
           , i.e. the connectivity loss of the line switch-off set                              , 
where      if link j is switched-off, or 0 otherwise. Secondly, the local optimization searches for the 
optimal intervention that minimizes the connectivity loss     of a specific area A,             . Thirdly, 
to reduce the impact of the mitigation operations, the number of lines being switched-off is also minimized, 
         
 
   . 
In order to fully take advantage of all the perspectives on network protection mentioned above, we look 
into a “hybrid” protection strategy that finds the set of lines to be switched-off,  , that minimize the 
connectivity loss of a pre-identified area A,       , the connectivity loss of the whole network,      , and 
the number of lines being switched-off,    
 
   . This originates a multi-objective optimization problem, 
which is here tackled by a MOEA as is detailed in Section 4. The algorithm for simulating the combined 
effects of cascading failures and protection strategies proceeds in successive stages as follows; it will be used 
for the fitness evaluation in the MOEA: 
step 1. Receive all the parameters used to characterize the current topology (after the initial attack) of the 
network   and the protection strategy. The parameters include the set of functioning nodes   and set 
of functioning links  , the load of each node    and the load of each link    , the maximum capacity 
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of each node    and the maximum capacity of each link    , and the vector   indicating the lines to 
be switched-off. Set the stage counter m = 0. It is noted that by setting   to be a zero vector, this 
algorithm is able to simulate the cascading failures without any protection operations. 
step 2. Remove a set of links indicated by   and apply Floyd’s shortest paths algorithm [50] to compute the 
load of each node (see eq. (1)) and link.  
step 3. Test each component for failure: for        , if node i is working and       then node i is 
removed; if link ij is working and         then link ij is removed. Increase the stage counter  by 
1. 
step 4. Evaluate the load of each component using Floyd’s shortest paths algorithm. Then each component 
that is operating is tested for failure: for        , if node i is working and       then node i 
fails; if link ij is working and         then link ij fails. 
step 5. If any working node fails, then increase   by 1 and return to step 4. Otherwise, terminate the 
algorithm. 
 
To simulate the initiating event, i.e. the failure of the most critical component in terms of load, some 
components need to be removed from the network prior to the execution of the algorithm presented above. 
The adopted protection strategy differs from the one presented in [1]. In particular, the former identifies 
solutions that are optimum with respect to    and     values at the end of the cascade propagation, while the 
latter identifies solutions that are optimum with respect to    and     values at the step immediately 
following protection, i.e. t = 1, and the propagation of the cascade following the step t = 1 is not accounted 
for in the optimization algorithm. Furthermore, the latter does not include the number of lines to switch off 
as an objective of the optimization. 
 
3.  GENERAL FORMULATION OF MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
 
Real world applications involve the simultaneous optimization of several objective functions, which are 
often competing or/and conflicting with one another, and subject to a number of equality and inequality 
constraints. In general, these multi-objective problems can be formulated as follows (in terms of 
minimization): 
 
                                                                                         (4) 
Subject to          
                                    
                              
                                  (5) 
 
where    is the o-th objective function, x is a decision vector that represents a solution, O is the number of 
objectives,    is the l-th of the L equality constraints and    is the m-th of the M inequality constraints. The 
objective functions       must be evaluated in correspondence of each decision variable vector   in the 
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search space. The final goal is to identify a set of optimal decision variable vectors   
           , 
instead of a single optimal solution. In this set of optimal solutions, no one can be regarded to be better than 
any other with respect to all the objective functions. The comparison of solutions may be achieved in terms 
of the concepts of Pareto optimality and dominance [51]: in case of a minimization problem, solution    is 
regarded to dominate solution    (     ) if both following conditions are satisfied: 
 
                                                                               (6) 
                                                                               (7) 
 
If any of the above two conditions is violated, the solution    does not dominate the solution   , and 
   is said to be non-dominated by   . The solutions that are non-dominated within the entire search space 
are denoted as Pareto-optimal and constitute the Pareto-optimal set, and the corresponding values of the 
objective functions form the so called Pareto-optimal front in the objective functions space. The goal of a 
multi-objective optimization algorithm is to guide the search for solutions in the Pareto-optimal set, while 
maintaining diversity so as to cover well the Pareto-optimal front and thus allow flexibility in the final 
decision on the solutions to be actually implemented. 
 
 
4.  NON-DOMINATED SORTING BINARY DIFFERENTIAL EVOLUTION ALGORITHM  
In this Section, we present the operation procedures of the NSBDE algorithm. DE has been originally 
proposed as a population-based global optimization algorithm for real-valued optimization problems [40]. 
The standard DE algorithm is simple and efficient and has been successfully applied in various scientific and 
engineering fields [41-43] often with superior performance than alternative optimization algorithms, e.g. 
particle swarm optimization and genetic algorithms [44]. Modified binary differential evolution (MBDE) is a 
binary version of DE developed to tackle single-objective binary-coded optimization problems [39]. In order 
to solve the combinatorial multi-objective problem of interest, we introduce into MBDE the fast non-
dominated sorting, ranking, and elitism techniques utilized in non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II 
(NSGA-II) [38]. The NSBDE algorithm proceeds with the following steps: 
 
Step 1. Initialization of parameters  
Define the values of: the population size NP, the crossover rate CR, the scaling factor F, and the maximum 
number of generations Nmax. 
Step 2. Generation of initial population and evaluation 
Set the generation number t equal to 1. Initialize the population       
      
   which contains M real-
valued parameter vectors of length K. Each vector is also called a chromosome and forms a candidate 
solution to the optimization problem. Each element of each vector    
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        takes a value       from the set {0, 1} with probability equal to 0.5: the element takes value ‘1’ if 
the corresponding line is to be switched-off, 0 otherwise. Evaluate each of the  chromosomes in the initial 
population     by performing the cascading failure protection simulation algorithm presented in Section 2.3. 
Return the values of the two indicators of the connectivity loss,    and    . The number of switched-off 
lines can be directly obtained by     
  
   . 
Step 3. Generation of intermediate population  
Apply the binary tournament selection operator [38] to the population    to generate a trial population 
       
       
   , which undergoes the evolution operations of mutation and crossover to become an 
intermediate population       
      
  . 
Step 3.1 Mutation 
Apply the mutation operator (7) onto each binary chromosome of     [39]: 
 
      
            
        
          
        
        
    
    where                      (8) 
 
where b is a positive real constant, often set to values around 6, F is the scaling factor,      
  ,      
  , and 
     
   are the elements at the j-th position of the three randomly chosen chromosomes    
      
    and    
  , 
with indexes           . After applying (7) onto the current chromosome, the noisy vector is 
generated as,  
 
   
   
                         
   
                                  
                                                      (9) 
 
where rand is a uniformly distributed random number within the interval [0,1]. 
 
Step 3.2 Crossover 
Apply the crossover operator (9) to mix the noisy and target vectors to create an intermediate vector   . 
The vector inherits different pieces from the noisy and target vectors, as regulated by the crossover rate 
CR. The commonly used binomial crossover is defined as: 
 
   
   
   
                                   
   
                                    
                             (10) 
 
where        is a uniform random value       ,          is a uniform discrete random number in the 
set          , j is the index of the dimensionality and K is the length of the chromosome. 
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Step 4. Evaluation  
Evaluate each of the  chromosomes in the population     by performing the cascading failure protection 
simulation algorithm presented in Section 2.3. Return the values of the two indicators of the connectivity 
loss,    and    . The number of switched-off lines can be directly obtained by     
  
   . 
Step 5. Union and sorting 
Combine the parent and intermediate populations to obtain a union population         . Rank the 
chromosomes in the population    by running the fast non-dominated sorting algorithm [38] with respect to 
the objective values, and identify the ranked non-dominated fronts            where    is the best front,    
is the second best front and    is the least good front. 
Step 6. Selection 
Select the first    chromosomes from    to create a new parent population     . The crowding distance 
measure is used in this step to compare the chromosomes with the same rank (a more ‘crowded’ 
chromosome has lower priority than a less ‘crowded’ one), where crowding refers to the density of solutions 
present in a neighborhood of a chromosome of specified radius [38]. Increase the generation number t by 1. 
Stop the algorithm if        otherwise go to Step 3.  
 
 
5.  CASE STUDY AND RESULTS 
5.1 Case study description and cascading failures without interventions 
The proposed optimization method for network protection strategies is exemplified with reference to the 
topological network of the 380 kV Italian power transmission network (Figure 1), focusing only on its 
structure with no further reference on the electrical properties. This network is a branch of a high voltage 
level transmission, which can be modeled as a graph of      nodes (      generators and       
distributors) and       edges. In Figure 1, the generators, i.e. hydro and thermal power plants, are 
represented by squares whereas the distribution substations are represented by circles. As shown in Section 
2.1, the load of each component is computed by Eq. (1). In a previous analysis by some of the authors [1], it 
was found that the removal of link 107 (connecting the nodes 78 (Bargi Stazione) and 81 (Calenzano)) 
results in the largest damage in terms of         and failure size (57 nodes fail at the end of cascading). 
Additionally, node 78 was found to be one of the most critical nodes in initiating the cascading failure 
propagation. 
Since the region of Lombardy includes the largest number of distribution nodes in the power grid 
(densely-dotted area in the upper side of Figure 1), i.e. 21 distributors, the local protection strategy focus on 
the minimization of the loss of connectivity of this specific area,       
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Figure 1. The 380 kV Italian power transmission network [52] 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the cascade from the initial failure until the end of cascading, when no 
intervention is performed. The tolerance parameter of the cascading failure model α is set to 0.3, in line with 
the previous work [1]. The elements in black color experience load changes beyond their capacity at the 
current cascading stage. It is shown that a large number of elements are overloaded (Figures 2.a and 2.b) and 
fail after the initial attack, and are removed from the network (Figures 2.b and 2.c). Conversely, the loads of 
some elements decrease after the initial attack. Nonetheless, in the following steps these elements exceed the 
maximum capacities and are removed from the network due to the further propagation of the cascade. The 
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cascade stops after the stage t =2 (Figure 2.c). At the end of the cascade, the network is clustered into several 
islands (Figure 2.d). 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 2. Illustration of the cascading failure propagation steps after the initial removal of line 107 and no 
intervention 
 
5.2 Results of the NSBDE algorithm 
According to the protection strategy presented in Section 2.3, it is assumed that the protection 
intervention (line switching) takes place only once when t = 0 after the failure of the transmission line 107. 
The configurations of the NSBDE parameters are summarized in Table 1. The NSBDE parameters and the 
number of experiment runs (equal to 5) are set identical to those in [1].   
 
 
Load variations w.r.t. original after initial attack
 
 
Initial attack
Load beyond capacity
Load increase
No load variation
Load decrease
Load variations at step 1 w.r.t. previous step
Load variations at step 2 w.r.t. previous step Load variations at step 3 w.r.t. previous step
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Table 1. The parameters of the NSBDE algorithm 
NSBDE parameters 
Population size NP 40 
Dimensionality of solutions K 171 
Crossover rate CR 0.8 
Scaling factor F 0.2 
Minimum fitness error 10
-4 
Maximum number of generations 1500 
 
The convergence plots of one experiment run of NSBDE algorithm are shown in Figure 3. The three 
panels in Figure 3 show the three extreme points of the best Pareto-front at each generation during the 
evolution (namely, the minimum global connectivity loss, the minimum local connectivity loss, and the 
minimum number of lines switched-off). It is observed that NSBDE is able to converge after about 600 
generations. 
 
Figure 3. The convergence plots of NSBDE algorithm 
 
The quality of the estimated Pareto front at each experiment run is assessed by the well-known hyper 
volume (HV) [53] measure. HV is defined as the volume or hyper volume between the estimated Pareto front 
and a predefined reference point. The exact computation of HV can be usually time-consuming; here, we 
resort to a MATLAB tool based on the Monte Carlo method [54]. The two parameters for HV calculation, 
the number of sampled random points and the reference point, are set to 10
7
 and (1, 1, 4), respectively. The 
mean value of the five HVs is 0.2771, the standard deviation is 0.0557, the maximal HV is 0.3276, and the 
minimal HV is 0.2175.  
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The final estimated Pareto front obtained by selecting the non-dominated solutions among those 
reached in the five different runs is illustrated in the 3-D space of Figure 4.a. The HV of this front is 0.3278, 
higher than any of the 5 individual fronts. The three 2-D projections of the solutions are shown in Figures 4.b 
to 4.d, respectively. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
 (d) 
Figure 4. The Pareto front in 3-D space and its 2-D projections 
 
The numerical results of these strategies in terms of the three objective functions,   ,     and   
 
    
(i.e. the solutions in the estimated Pareto front) are presented in Table 2. They are non-dominated to each 
other in terms of the three objectives. However, strategy #5 is of particular interest since it has significant 
smaller    and    values than the other solutions, except strategy #6, and it requires switching off a set of 
only 3 transmission lines, less than in strategy #6. 
 
Table 2. The non-dominated solutions of 5 NSBDE experiment runs 
Strategy ID           
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4 0.469 0.300 2 
5 0.132 0.067 3 
6 0.122 0.067 4 
 
 
5.3 Analyses and interpretation of the results 
Strategy #5 is selected for the illustration of cascades development considering the optimal operator 
interventions. Figure 5 contains the ‘snap-shot’ of the cascading failure process at each stage from the initial 
attack until its end. The state of the network following the initial attack presented in Figure 2.a and in Figure 
5.a is the same. Several components are potentially overloaded and would be disconnected from the system 
if no protection was put in action (Figure 2.b). Unlike the scenario presented in Section 5.1, the protection is 
applied (Figure 5.b), and three links are switched off as part of the protection strategy at the stage t = 1, i.e. 
links 43-44, 49-52, and 64-78. As the result of the protection strategy, the potential overloads are relieved 
and the cascading failure is successfully mitigated after these links are switched off (Figure 5.b). Figure 5.b 
shows that none of the elements exceeds the maximum capacity in this scenario. Therefore, there are no 
further disconnections in the network after the protection action is put in action (Figure 5.c), the cascade 
cannot propagate in the network and the failure process stops at t = 1 (Figures 5.c and 5.d). Throughout the 
cascading failure process only 4 links are disconnected, including the initial removal, and no node is 
disconnected resulting in S = 0, i.e. the cascade size is zero. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
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(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5. The illustration of cascading failure propagation after the failure of line 107 with optimal 
intervention strategy #5 
 
Figure 6 shows the effects of the operator optimal intervention by comparing the    and     values of 
the four optimal strategies in Table 2 at each stage of the cascade. We note that the NSBDE optimization 
identifies that no intervention can be a possible optimum protection strategy, indicated as strategy #1, 
because it provides the global minimum of the number of lines to switch off. Among all strategies, strategy 
#5 presents the best local connectivity loss and the second best global connectivity loss, at the end of the 
cascade failure after the protection strategy is applied at    . These results are consistent with the cascade 
evolution presented in Figure 5. Strategy #1 (no protection) performs better than the other three protection 
strategies at t = 1, but it allows the cascade to propagate and to affect the whole network with disruptive 
consequences. Conversely, strategies #4, #5 and #6 are able to stop the failure process at t = 1. 
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Figure 6. The cascade development in terms of global connectivity loss,   , and local connectivity loss,    , 
after the failure of line 107, with and without interventions 
 
Looking at the previous results obtained in [1] we note that the effect of introducing the third objective 
of minimizing the number of lines to be switched off, of looking at the outcome of the whole cascades, of 
integrating non-dominated sorting mechanisms in the optimization search (Table 3), leads to strategies 
obtained by NSBDE which are in general superior in terms of the connectivity losses, the number of lines 
being switched off, and the cascade size. In particular, the NSBDE strategy #3 and #4 seem most promising 
and practical because they result in significantly smaller    and    values than those relative to the other 
strategies, and they require significantly lower numbers of switching off, i.e.    
 
    = 3 or 4. Furthermore, 
the cascade size S is equal to zero because no node is disconnected from the network at the end of the failure 
process. 
 
Table 3. The results of the NSBDE and the results published in [1] 
Method Strategy ID           
 
     S 
No 
intervention 
1 0.96 0.99 0 57 
MBDE [1] 1 0.76 0.81 31 10 
 2 0.77 0.89 26 13 
 3 0.75 0.80 30 9 
NSBDE 2 0.719 0.548 1 12 
 3 0.715 0.556 1 10 
 4 0.469 0.300 2 0 
 5 0.132 0.067 3 0 
 6 0.122 0.067 4 0 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
We embrace the complex network perspective on the network protection (NP) problem. This perspective 
allows characterizing the topology of network systems and identifying critical parts by an analysis that is 
preliminary and complementary to more detailed approaches [55-58]. The feasibility of line switching is 
evaluated by a model of cascading failure process which relies on a topological representation of the network 
connection pattern [46]. The abstract model of flow and cascades is not based on the physics of the actual 
power flow but rather mimics the flow in the network based on the shortest paths that connect generation and 
load nodes. 
Given the somewhat abstract level of the modeling, the results gained with respect to the vulnerable 
points (or lines) in the system (first findings) may not be clear-cut, and major hidden vulnerabilities may still 
be expected. Then, to achieve a higher degree of accuracy, system understanding has to be further developed 
and more detailed information about the system and its operating environment may be needed. The re-
assessment of simplifications made earlier may call for more sophisticated methods for their successive in-
depth analysis [59].  
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In order to draw firm conclusions about the significance of topological methods, e.g. in electricity 
infrastructure vulnerability characterization, current research focuses on systematically comparing their 
results with those obtained from power flow-based models [52, 57, 60]. The general feeling is that only a 
partial superposition of functional and structural criticalities should be expected. In this view, the abstract 
models of flow and cascading failures that are used in this study cannot be interpreted as an approximation of 
real, functional data. 
The research presented, thus exemplifies the proposed methodology with reference to a power 
transmission network, focusing only on its structure and with no further reference on the physical and 
functional properties. As described in Section 2, the load of a node is assumed equal to the total number of 
shortest paths connecting every source node to every sink node passing through that component. This 
assumption may not be functionally valid for electrical power grids, where power flows according to 
physical rules such as Kirchhoff’s laws, and load demand. Nevertheless, it serves the purpose of the paper 
which is to look into the structural properties and apply the NP optimization framework to a complex 
network of realistic size. 
In the energy field, NP by line switching is common practice in problems like line overloads [31], loss 
and/or cost reductions [61], system security improvements [62], or a combination of them [32]. Examples of 
line switching in other types of operations are the traffic closure due to road work, accidents or natural 
disasters, interruption of internet or telecommunication lines. For practical uses, the preliminary analysis 
propounded can serve for guiding more detailed approaches. Nonetheless, the use of line switching, here 
taken only as an example of protection measure, must be carefully considered in practice: as seen in our 
results too, the action of switching off transmission lines during a failure might itself worsen the behavior of 
the system in some cases.  
In this direction, introduction of physical characteristics into abstract modeling approaches is envisaged. 
Indeed, future research steps will consider the extension of the abstract model of cascading failures “beyond 
network abstraction” to incorporate physical properties of the engineered network systems which are 
investigated. This must be done in a way to bridge the modeling close to reality, without over-complicating 
the model that remains appealing if it requires minimum information and provides prompt results about 
network vulnerability.  
Nevertheless, while cascading model abstracts from the modeling of the realistic power flow, the 
proposed optimization method can obtain protective strategies of practical feasibility, i.e. suggesting few 
lines to be turned off to maintain network reliability [34, 55]. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper presents research work investigating the search for optimal network protection strategies against 
cascading failures within the complex network systems perspective. More specifically, the focus is on the 
strategy of disconnecting edges in order to avoid or alleviate component overloads that may arise from the 
occurrence of failures in the infrastructure, which hence may initiate a cascading failure process. Such a 
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strategy may be employed either as a manual strategy or as an implemented automatic control strategy, in 
order to re-route flows so that heavily congested components are relieved. 
A new algorithm, namely NSBDE, is proposed for the search of optimal network protection strategies 
against cascading failures. This algorithm improves the previously proposed MBDE [1], three-fold: 1) in the 
optimization problem formulation, a third objective function is included to minimize the impact of the 
switching off operations onto the existing network topology; 2) still in the optimization problem formulation, 
the final results of cascades, rather than only a short horizon of one step cascading, are used to evaluate the 
effects of the switch off strategy; 3) in the MOEA, the fast non-dominated sorting mechanisms are 
incorporated into the MBDE algorithm.  
Numerical application to the topological structure 380 kV Italian power transmission network has 
proved the proposed algorithm to be both promising and practical.  
The problem formulation and the optimization algorithm proposed in this work appear to be effective to 
obtain the optimal network protection strategy for mitigating the cascading failures at a low cost. Further 
improvements can be carried out in the following directions: 1) extend the applications onto other cascading 
models with more specific physical properties, e.g. OPA and PSA; 2) comparisons with other evolutionary 
algorithms, e.g. quantum inspired evolutionary algorithm [63], genetic algorithm [33], simulated annealing 
[64], etc.  
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